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Abstract 
Affective polarization and the retention of mistaken beliefs share a common mediator. 
The media. Both are extremely similar in terms of confidence in their beliefs and the tipping 
point associated when trying to break away from these mistaken or affectively polarized beliefs. 
By proving the relationship between both implies a bigger actor in utilizing both as a means of 
building media strength and solidifying its audience. That affective polarizations effect on 
causing a retention of mistaken beliefs is a devastating strategy utilized by media sources. This 
relationship is already seen with misinformation, as people largely go back to believing their 
mistaken beliefs, regardless if they have been proven otherwise previously with correct 
information. Alongside Mason, Lilliana’s definition of Partisan-Ideological Sorting, this hints 
that affectively polarized beliefs should act similarly to mistaken beliefs over time, even if 
correct information was already heeded to previously. 
Keywords: affective polarization, partisan-ideological sorting, misinformed beliefs, 
tipping point, media 
Introduction 
The effect of misinformation upon the public and its solidifying affect alongside prior 
beliefs or preferences is a problem. When a person confidently holds onto mistaken beliefs, they 
are a victim of misinformation. Therefore, the harder it will be for them to accept correct 
information from any source. However, each person does have a tipping point in which they 
realize they were misinformed. This is of course great news in combating misinformation. 
Although, it has been shown that those who reached this tipping point, eventually go back to 
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accepting misinformation again. Prior beliefs and preferences do play a role in this, but the 
prevalence of this retention would not be complete without another causal factor. The media. As 
the media is a mediator in both spreading misinformation and affective polarization then surely 
there must be some overlap. The overlap appears in the retention of misinformation due to the 
strength of prior beliefs or preferences and media sources promoting affectively polarized 
beliefs. This then leads into the primary question of how does affective polarization relate to the 
retention of mistaken beliefs among individuals that previously recognized they have been 
misinformed?  
Currently the only causes of the retention of mistaken beliefs among individuals that had 
prior knowledge of having been misinformed are the strengths of prior beliefs and preferences. 
There seems to be a missing link though in this correlation. The public usually does not consider 
politics to be of the upmost importance. Therefore, the likelihood that these individuals were 
only influenced by their own prior beliefs or preferences is rather low. Not to say that prior 
beliefs or preferences do not influence this retention, but something else needs to have pushed 
these individuals back. The most logical choice considering the topic area must be the media, as 
it is a massive influencer on political opinion and behavior. This correlation also implies another 
finding between media and misinformation. That it is possible that media sources are utilizing 
affective polarization in such a way to keep its viewers coming back, which properly aligns with 
the phenomenon of this retention of mistaken beliefs and affectively polarized individuals. This 
is because these individuals are no longer concerned with their own core beliefs, but those of the 
opposing party. Hence, solidifying their confidence within their party and increasing the 
likelihood of their retention, even if they can break away from these beliefs. 
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Literature Review 
Affective polarization, misinformation, and media influence seem to all tie in together. 
What is known about these topics certainly implies this. Affective polarization, otherwise known 
as negative emotions deriving from combining social identity with political ideology is becoming 
an increasing problem in today’s political behavior. Another term that conceptualizes this is 
partisan-ideological sorting, which essentially states that as a person begins to associate social 
identity more so with political ideology, then the more likely they are to associate anger along 
with their partisanship. Otherwise known as negative partisanship, this is further illustrated as, 
“Partisan-Ideological sorting is capable of encouraging an increasingly angry and enthusiastic 
electorate” (Mason, 2018, p.93). This is due to its ability to make people under the influence of 
affective polarization less concerned with their own core beliefs and more so concerned with 
their oppositions beliefs. This is also shown when, “a growing proportion of Americans dislike 
the opposing party more than they like their own party” (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016, p.21).  
More specifically in making sure that the other partisanship loses no matter what, rather 
than supporting their own. This is certainly problematic as political behavior in this sense is no 
longer political. Rather it is the bickering of both sides about how the other is wrong because 
they are not the same. There is no healthy argument or discussion about political issues or events 
when this is involved, but rather just the creation of a lot of noise through anger towards the 
opposition. A helpful illustration of this can be relating this to a Super Bowl game. However, 
instead of supporting one team and occasionally insulting the other team. It is comprised of 
mostly insulting the other team and either showing happiness if the other team loses or anger if 
not. This is also seen when the people affectively polarized, “react to threat, anger, and the 
strength of a whole cohort of identities that are increasingly harmonized. When individuals 
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participate in politics driven by team spirit or anger, the responsiveness to the electorate is 
impaired” (Mason, 2000, p.126).  
 This anger originates from the definition of affective polarization seen above. Normally 
differences in political ideologies or partisanships do not create such negative emotions that are 
seen today towards the opposition. It is the overlap of social identity that introduces the notion of 
emotion and anger. When a person talks politically against a certain issue or candidate without 
overlapping with social identity, it can be a healthy discussion or argument. Thus, healthy 
politics in its most simple form. However, when social identity is included, any slight made 
against that person’s political ideology or partisanship is automatically an attack against them as 
a person. Therefore, introducing the negative emotions that can come from that. This is also seen 
as, “the robust presence of an ingrained prejudice that grows out of the increasing alignment 
between partisan, ideological, racial, and religious social identities” (Mason, 2000, p.77).  
 As for the noise that this can create, it appears to be a relation of both misinformation and 
media. The noise is the ranting among those under the influence of affective polarization and 
those attempting to spread it further through media or social media. Misinformation can be 
described as simply not the full story or not all the information on a certain topic. More than 
likely it is just enough information to spin a story in favor of the media showing it. However, that 
will be discussed later as to why or how media sources do this. The primary factor of 
misinformation that more than likely relates to affective polarization is its ability to create 
extreme confidence within the belief of misinformation. As seen above affective polarization 
introduces extreme negative emotions towards different partisanships. Hence, these people are 
likely to accept misinformation that aligns with their affective polarized beliefs more so than the 
average affectively unpolarized individual.  
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 The primary reason for this confidence is shown to be the strength of prior beliefs and 
preferences, which can also easily align with affective polarized beliefs or preferences. 
Nonetheless, the longer an individual believes in misinformation the more confident that person 
is in that information. Also, depending on that person’s knowledge level on that certain topic, 
influences if they are successfully misinformed or not, this can be described as a sort of, 
“distillation of a person’s lifetime experiences” (Zaller, 1992, p.23). Therefore, the less 
politically informed or sophisticated an individual is, the more likely they are to be confident in 
the misinformation provided to them. There is another association with belief however and it 
comes from if they are naturally untrusting of media sources, which is becoming a new 
phenomenon because of disinformation or fake news. This is seen in Tuckner, et al., as they, 
“identified 400,000 bots responsible for posting about 3.8 million tweets during the last month of 
2016 U.S. presidential elections, … Reports from, among others, NBC News, WIRED, Wall 
Street Journal, and CNN, give ample qualitative evidence of bot and troll activity, including 
setting up Facebook groups; attempting to organize offline events; and spreading highly 
explosive and divisive messages on racial relations, gun and abortion rights, etc” (Tuckner et al., 
2018, p.31). Not only does this make people wary of where their information is coming from, but 
also has the capability to increase confidence in the media that they regularly utilize. Thus, 
further solidifying confidence in misinformation from their prior or preferential media sources, 
while creating paranoia towards different and even informative sources. In conjunction with 
political unsophistication and if the misinformation provided aligns with past beliefs or 
preferences. This adds onto the already difficult task of informing the citizenry, as fake news can 
increase confidence in familiar media sources, which may or may not be reliable, and increase 
confidence in the misinformation provided, especially if they are politically uninformed. 
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 It has been discussed as to why certain people accept misinformation more than others, 
but it is also important to note that those of less political sophistication are also more susceptible 
to be more confident in their misinformation than those with more political knowledge. The 
difference in levels of confidence matters primarily because it increases the difficulty for an 
individual to accept correct information. In other words, it raises their tipping point of realizing 
that they were misinformed and were wrong in their confidence of that certain information. 
Everyone has a different tipping point relating to political misinformation due to the factors 
discussed earlier. This has been illustrated through misinformation’s alignment with either prior 
beliefs or preferences and the political knowledge that a person holds, which can make it easier 
to question information received more so than others. This also relates to how easily or difficult 
it is for an individual to be affectively polarized.  
 Not only are levels of political sophistication indicators of if a person has a lower 
likelihood or not to accept misinformation, but also that a less informed individual has a higher 
likelihood to fall into the trap of affective polarization. Primarily due to the notion that it is easier 
to hate the other sides beliefs, rather than supporting and understanding their own partisanships 
beliefs. This negative emotion can even over power a person’s ability to recognize change in 
their own partisan’s core beliefs. Thus, setting an unfortunate course for American politics 
because if this gains more strength then it may even shape how politics are conducted in a way to 
accommodate for this affect. Hence, how is this avoided or fixed? 
 Unfortunately, if misinformation is correlated with affective polarization then fixing this 
issue might not be enough. It has been shown that if or when an individual reaches their tipping 
point and accepts that they were wrong in their confidence of a misinformed belief. This is 
largely shown to be temporary (Sturgis et al., 2005). Primarily due to people eventually falling 
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back into the habit of picking up their prior beliefs and preferences. That, “unless they are “hit in 
between the eyes” with the right facts, they continue to judge policy on the basis of their 
mistaken beliefs” (Kuklinski, 2000, p.810). Regardless, this is most of the time not enough to 
prevent a person from falling back into believing mistaken beliefs once again due to the strength 
of their prior beliefs and preferences. Hence, “the polarization that our politics must confront is 
thus not just over issues and public policy, but over reality itself” (Flynn, et al., 2017, p.144).  
However, this by itself does not make the best argument as something seems to be 
missing from this puzzle of why. The public are usually not that interested in politics in general. 
People usually do not sit in their home and brood over politics in such a way that would make 
them go back to believing misinformation. Hence, there should be another factor here that is not 
mentioned or measured. From the previous arguments over the importance of affective 
polarization and misinformation it can be inferred that this mediator is in fact the media. 
 It is no secret that media sources can feed misinformation to its viewers to uphold a 
certain viewpoint within their programming. The best examples of this can be seen with Fox 
news or MSNBC. One is the extreme right and the other the extreme left. Their methods either 
are agenda setting, priming, or framing. Agenda setting is essentially, media controlling what the 
public sees as the most important news at the time and altering it accordingly as the media source 
sees fit. Thus, setting the publics priorities depending on the agenda that the media source is 
attempting to adhere to. This is also defined as, “television news shapes the American public’s 
political priorities. These effects appear to be neither momentary, as our experimental results 
indicate, nor permanent, as our time-series results reveal. All told our evidence implies an 
American public with a limited memory for last month’s news and a recurrent vulnerability to 
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today’s. When television news focuses on a problem, the public’s priorities are altered, and 
altered again as television news moves on to something new” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p.33).  
Then there is priming, which for example is when a media source makes the people 
watching dictate if something that a president is doing is either good or bad. Thus, assigning the 
publics evaluation of a president by his actions as dictated by the media source. This can 
otherwise be described as, “the influence of television news coverage on Americans’ 
assessments of presidential performance depends partly on how the news portrays his 
responsibilities. As shown here, stories implying that the president is responsible for a national 
problem are more powerful in two respects: they lead viewers to greater certainty about his 
performance on that problem, and they induce viewer to attach greater importance to that 
performance in evaluating the president overall” (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, p.88).  
Lastly, there is framing. Framing utilizes the method of dumbing down a very complex 
issue in a way to influence the watchers. Instead of stressing a certain side of a story as priming 
does, framing just focuses on one or two aspects of the story to influence its viewers. This is also 
described as, “frames shape individual understanding and opinion concerning an issue by 
stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, reducing a usually complex 
issue down to one or two central aspects” (Nelson et al., 1997, p.568). 
As for why media sources do this, the reasons are numerous. The two most obvious in the 
media industry are money and power. However, more specifically it could be elites influencing 
mass political behavior for their favor and utilizing the methods above to do so or even going so 
far as to create or support conspiracy theories to implicate their rivals. Though this might be a 
stretch in relating affective polarization, misinformation, and media influence together, but it 
does surprisingly fit in nicely. This is due to how conspiracy theories are viewed by the public 
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and how they play a role in the bigger picture of implicating rivals. Conspiracy theories are 
generally considered extremely paranoid or crazy by most. However, when these conspiracy 
theories make the news, it is a different story. If these conspiracy theories have a partisanship 
attached to them and are supported by the opposing side. Then they start to gather attention and 
even in some cases believability. This can relate to media and misinformation depending on how 
media sources display the conspiracy theory to its viewers. This is also seen as, “Republican 
elites may be more likely than their Democratic counterparts to float CTs that implicate their 
political nemeses. It could be the case that high-knowledge conservatives are picking up on these 
CTs that are being reported in the media, and endorse them as a result” (Miller et al., 2016, 
p.838). It also relates to affective polarization because it can cause negative emotions, depending 
on which side the conspiracy theory attempts to implicate and depends on how media sources 
cover it. Thus, spreading affective polarization through the two variables of misinformation and 
media.  
A great example of how conspiracy theories can relate to affective polarization can be 
seen with climate change. This once bipartisan issue of environmental protection has become 
exceedingly polarized due to extreme partisanships and affectively polarized beliefs. The 
conspiracy theory is that global warming or climate change is a hoax, which is supported by the 
extreme right. Whereas, the left seeks to prevent future damage on the earth by the effects of 
climate change. The debunking on climate change is starting to diminish, however it is still 
obvious that it is far from becoming a bipartisan issue once again. This is seen as, “many studies 
find that political ideology (typically measured with a single item) is a strong predictor of 
climate change views of the American public, rivaling party identification. In both cases, the 
shared commitment to an anti-regulatory view of government, or what has been called “market 
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fundamentalism,” is assumed to be the crucial motivator of opposition to recognizing the 
significance of human-caused climate change and thus the necessity of developing policies to 
lower greenhouse gas emissions” (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2015, p.12). The reason for this 
comes from several possible factors. Elite influence as described earlier or the medias ability to 
prime, frame, and set the agenda of its viewers. This has been a recurring problem and is a prime 
example of how affect polarization can affect not only political behavior but can also implicate 
policy.  
 This is what is known about this topic area, however there are a few unknowns in this 
area of research. Such as, if media sources are utilizing affective polarization in such a way to 
solidify their audience or increase retention of mistaken beliefs among those that realized they 
were misinformed? Or is this just a positive phenomenon for the media, which is not acted upon, 
but rather just a natural occurrence? This leads to the research question of how does affective 
polarization relate to the retention of mistaken beliefs among individuals that previously 
recognized they have been misinformed? If there is proven to be a causal connection between 
these two variables of retention of mistaken beliefs and levels of affective polarized beliefs then 
the questions above can certainly be inferred and thus, built upon.  
Theory 
 Due to what is known and not known per the literature review it is rather understandable 
as to how this question came into fruition and why it is important. The question is how does 
affective polarization relate to the retention of mistaken beliefs among individuals that 
previously recognized they have been misinformed? Media is a primary mediator for both, thus 
there is a high probability that there is a correlation between the two. The retention of mistaken 
beliefs among individuals that previously realized they have been misinformed properly falls into 
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same effects of affective polarization. That people who are affectively polarized become less 
concerned with their own core beliefs or preferences and more so concerned with the 
oppositions. Hence, making it easier for a person that realized they were mistaken to be tricked 
into believing it again as they are no longer concerned with the mistaken belief at hand, but 
rather that of the opposition.  
 Another important factor that correlates the two is medias role in both. Media sources 
benefit from spreading affective polarization because anger sells and especially when it comes to 
politics. As for retentions of mistaken beliefs, media gains the benefit of solidifying its audience 
through misinformation. Thus, increasing their viewer numbers while keeping them from 
transitioning to their opposing media source. Such as, Fox or MSNBC. Therefore, properly 
displaying as to why this correlation makes sense and the possible benefits for research that this 
could present if proved correct.  
Research Design 
 The purpose of this research is to provide insight to if and how affectively polarized 
beliefs relate to the retentions of mistaken beliefs. This then would infer medias involvement in 
this relationship, thus giving way to possible future research. By utilizing strategies discussed 
earlier, media sources have the potential to solidify their audience and even keep individuals 
coming back after they realized they had been misinformed. To further illustrate this connection, 
a case study of the book, Uncivil Agreement (2018) by Mason is conducted, alongside relative 
works depicted in the literature review.   
Discussion 
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 When considering both affectively polarized beliefs and misinformed beliefs, a similarity 
appears in their definitions that points towards a relationship. Affectively polarized beliefs, or 
more specifically partisan-ideological sorting, as defined by Mason, essentially states that as a 
person begins to associate social identity more so with political ideology, then the more likely 
they are to associate anger along with their partisanship. This anger in turn makes these 
individuals less receptive to any information relative to the opposing party. The notion of anger 
or emotion also coincides with confidence of one’s beliefs, specifically in this case, the 
confidence of anger towards the opposition’s beliefs, rather than the importance of confidence in 
their own parties’ beliefs. In relation, a misinformed belief can be understood as either accepting 
a partial story, for its entirety, or misconstruing information due to a lack of knowledge in that 
area, or a combination of both. Prior beliefs and preferences influence how susceptible 
individuals are in accepting misinformation. More so, prior beliefs and preferences in relation to 
accepting misinformation, increases confidence levels in these individuals of their misinformed 
beliefs. In conjunction with emotion, their confidence or unwillingness to communicate with 
those identifying with the opposing party, increases further. This is further illustrated as, “highly 
sorted partisans will be biased against their outparty friends, neighbors, and romantic interests no 
matter what they think about political issues” (Mason, 2018, p.72). Based upon the relationship 
between believability of misinformation due to an inept understanding and the unwillingness for 
those affectively polarized to communicate with the opposing side due to an inept understanding 
of their own parties’ beliefs, infers a correlation.  
 By identifying a correlation between both affectively polarized beliefs and misinformed 
beliefs, this starts to paint a bigger picture for those affected. As it was illustrated in the literature 
review, those that reach their tipping point in relation to misinformed beliefs, largely revert 
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eventually. In conjunction with affectively polarized beliefs, the same could very well be 
observed. Considering the similar sources of affectively polarized beliefs, it is not unreasonable, 
if not more so, to associate the difficulty of not reverting after reaching that tipping point. Prior 
beliefs and preferences play a role in both confidence and level of emotion towards certain 
beliefs. Also, the consistent negative sources of information stay the same for both either through 
friends, family, and media. Thus, the two also share similar difficulties when considering the 
reversion towards either misinformed or affectively polarized beliefs.  
 As it was hinted towards in the literature review, one of the major influencers of political 
behavior, or more specifically, affectively polarized beliefs and misinformed beliefs is the media. 
The most obvious effect of sustaining a misinformed public or affectively polarized public is to 
solidify their audience and keep them from turning towards the opposing media source. Although 
the correlation between both media and misinformed/ affectively polarized beliefs is a rather 
sound strategy, it certainly does not imply causation. This is further illustrated with the 
correlations between similarities of affectively polarized beliefs with misinformed beliefs, and 
their similar difficulties in avoiding reversion. Rather, the purpose of making these connections 
is to further the understanding of how to potentially combat these phenomena by associating 
known solutions of both towards a joint effort.  
 Informing the citizenry has been a known strategy in reducing belief in misinformation, 
however, the primary difficulty of this approach lies within consistency. It has been shown that 
actively informing individuals increases their political sophistication, although over time these 
individuals eventually fall back into their prior beliefs or preferences due to several factors 
(Sturgis et al., 2005). Hence, simply informing the citizenry does not seem to be an ideal form of 
inducing informative decision making in the long term, at least as a singular strategy. Rather than 
14 
 
utilizing a bottom up approach to help alleviate this issue, a top down approach can also be 
utilized. This approach could be illustrated as working with media sources to portray cross-
cutting ideologies or beliefs in a positive light. In other words, instead of portraying the opposite 
side in an affectively polarized way, which would be viewed upon as the opposition, rather 
portray them more so as an alternative viewpoint. This could very well reduce the aggression 
towards the opposing sides, if done correctly. Although, the one primary weakness of such an 
approach would be if media sources would be willing to do such a thing. If not, then this could 
very well be indicative of a correlation between media and its misinformed/ affectively polarized 
audience, which is considered above. Although both strategies represent seemingly longshot 
solutions, they do represent a possibility of reducing this negative political phenomenon. 
Considering that informing the citizenry using political experts and continuity works in the short 
term, there is hope in establishing more cross-cutting ideologies, separate from social identity in 
the long run. Thus, further study needs to be implemented to identify potential solutions or 
remedies to this negative phenomenon on the United States political landscape.  
Conclusion 
 Media influence is a well-known actor in the realm of political behavior. It is a primary 
distributor of affective polarized beliefs and misinformation. As the retention of misinformed 
beliefs correlates with affective polarization, this gives deeper insight into the already growing 
negative effects that affective polarization can create. This also adds another layer onto the 
negative influence that media can have on political behavior and how manipulative it can be 
when utilizing mis or disinformation. More so, this infers affective polarization as a possible 
strategy for media sources to utilize in retaining its audience, which will prove to be detrimental 
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to future American political behavior as politics continue to deteriorate as a result of this 
unreality that affective polarization creates.  
  
16 
 
Works Cited 
Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven Webster. "The rise of negative partisanship and the 
nationalization of US elections in the 21st century." Electoral Studies 41 (2016): 12-22. 
Dunlap, Riley E., Aaron M. McCright, and Jerrod H. Yarosh. "The political divide on 
climate change: Partisan polarization widens in the US." Environment: Science and Policy for 
Sustainable Development 58.5 (2016): 4-23. 
Flynn, D. J., Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. "The nature and origins of 
misperceptions: Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics." Political 
Psychology 38 (2017): 127-150. 
Shanto, Iyenger, and D. Kinder. "News that matters: Televisión and American opinion." 
(1987). 
Kuklinski, James H., et al. "Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship." 
Journal of Politics 62.3 (2000): 790-816. 
Mason, Lilliana. Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity. University of 
Chicago Press, 2018. 
Miller, Joanne M., Kyle L. Saunders, and Christina E. Farhart. "Conspiracy endorsement 
as motivated reasoning: The moderating roles of political knowledge and trust." American 
Journal of Political Science 60.4 (2016): 824-844. 
Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. "Media framing of a civil 
liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance." American Political Science Review 91.3 (1997): 
567-583. 
17 
 
Sturgis, Patrick, Caroline Roberts, and Nick Allum. "A different take on the deliberative 
poll: Information, deliberation, and attitude constraint." Public Opinion Quarterly 69.1 (2005): 
30-65. 
Tuckner, Joshua A. et al. “Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political 
Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature.” (2018). 
Zaller, John R. The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge university press, 
1992. 
